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LIFO-Cost of Inventory under
The Income Tax Act
PETER B. GLASSFORD *

The obstacles in the path of applying modern accounting methods
to the computation of income for tax purposes are of real and
important concern. One such problem, which is the subject of this
article, is the method of costing inventory for tax purposes. In most
businesses it is almost impossible to precisely identify each item in
its inventory and to allocate to it an exact cost, and therefore some
arbitrary method must be adopted. Of the major methods of costing
inventory recognized by accountants, LIFO (last in first out) seems
to be the only one objected to by the Minister of National Revenue
for tax purposes.
The problem is more easily stated than solved. Accounting
methods and accepted commercial practice have changed radically
in the last thirty years. The Balance Sheet, formerly the most important of the annual financial statements has been downgraded in
favour of the Statement of Profit and Loss. The refusal of the
courts to accept LIFO in determining income appears to be based on
earlier judicial decisions which in turn were predicated on the
generally accepted commercial practice of emphasising the Balance
Sheet. The present Income Tax Act1 recognizes many exceptions to
the principle of regarding the income tax year without reference to
previous or subsequent years, i.e. the provisions allowing the farmer
to average his income over five years and the loss carryovers permitted taxpayers by the Act. As prices for the businessman can
fluctuate as violently as the weather for the farmer, perhaps our
present situation should also qualify as an exception to avoid the
inequity of taxing, dn some businesses, fictional paper profits on
inventory perhaps never to be realized. The specific problem here
then merges with the larger one of whether accepted commercial and
accounting methods will be adopted in determining income for tax
purposes.
The relevant sections of the Income Tax Act are Sections 14(2)
and Section 139 (1) (w):
Section 14. "For the purpose of computing income the property described
in an inventory shall be valued at its cost to the taxpayer or its fair
• Mr. Glassford, B.Comm. (McGill) is presently in the third year at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
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market value, whichever is lower, or in such other maner as may be
permitted by regulation."
Section 139(1) (W). "'inventory' means a description of property the
cost or value of which is relevant in computing a taxpayers' income."

The only regulation issued provides that "for the purpose of
computing the income of a taxpayer from a business:
(a) all the property in the inventory may be valued at the cost
to the taxpayer, or
(b) all the property in the inventory may be valued at the fair
market value."2
The taxpayer may thus value his inventory at cost, market, or
perhaps a combination of the two, but nowhere in the Act is "cost" or
"market" defined. The Income Tax Department has recognized that
the average cost and FIFO (first in first out) methods of determining
the cost of inventories are appropriate for income tax purposes.
However, it has not been prepared to accept the LIFO (last in first
out) method. In M.N.R. v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd.,3 it was
held by the Privy Council, reversing judgments of the Exchequer
Court,4 and the Supreme Court of Canada, 5 that the LIFO method
was not appropriate in determining income under the Income War
Tax Act.6 I shall return to this decision but first I would like to
briefly discuss the meaning of "cost".
It is generally accepted commercial and accounting practice that
where, as in most types of businesses, It is impossible to ascertain the
specific cost of items in an inventory, some assumption is necessary
for the purpose of determining the cost of inventory on hand at the
end of any year. The most authoritative statement from an accounting point of view in Canada on the meaning of "cost" as used in
inventory valuation is to be found in Bulletin No. 5 of the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants. The most common and widely
accepted of these assumptions are:
1.

Average (ost

Under this method the cost of each item of a particular type
which is on hand at the end of the year is taken to be the weighted
average of the cost of all such items which were (a) on hand at the
beginning of the year, and (b) acquired during the course of the year.
2. FIFO (first in first out)
If this method is used the items first purchased are assumed to
have been disposed of first and the cost of the inventory on hand at
the end of the year is considered to be the cost of the items most
recently acquired.
2 Dominion Income Tax Regulations, Part XVII, s. 1800.

3 [1956] A.C. 85.
4 Anaconda American Brass Ltd. v. M.N.E., 52 DTC 1111.

5MV... v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., 54 DTC 1179.
6 R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.
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3. LIFO (last in first out)
Under this method, generally speaking, the last items acquired
are assumed to have been disposed of first and the cost of the items
on hand at the year end is considered to be the cost of the same
number of items first acquired.
The choice of methods to be employed depends on the type of
business and the following general rule was stated in Bulletin No. 5
of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants:
"The method selected for determining cost should be one which results

in the fairest matching of costs against revenues regardless of whether
or not the method corresponds to the physical flow of goods. Thus if the
selling price of the finished products varies currently with the price of
the raw material, the LIFO method of cost determination may be appropriate even though the goods first received are those first disposed of."

The above principle has been recognized by The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the American Institute of
Accountants.
LIFO is also recognized as appropriate in a business which has
a large investment in inventory consisting of a few basic materials
and a relatively stable inventory. If prices of the materials in the
inventory are subject to wide price fluctuations LIFO is essential to
arrive at a realistic profit picture for the year.
LIFO commends itself to accountants because it shows how costs
not physical goods should flow, and over a period of years it
eliminates the artificial profits and losses to a large extent. The
questions remain then whether physical identification is a factor
which governs the determination of income and whether the Minister
can insist upon the accounting system which will more closely arrive
at the actual inventory.
Legislation in the United States7 enacted in 1938 and 1939 permitted a company to prepare its income tax returns under the LIFO
system upon certain conditions which may be summarized as follows:
(i) The Company must start with a cost inventory on the same
basis as it ended its last FIFO period of cost.
(ii) Once adopted, the LIFO method cannot be changed without
the consent of the appropriate revenue officials.
(iii) The Company must keep its corporate accounts on the same
basis as its tax accounts.
(iv) It is not a compulsory system, but a Company may elect to
adopt the LIFO method.8
The Privy Council in the Anaconda case took notice of several
American decisions where the "base stock" method was considered
and held unacceptable for income tax purposes. Any analogy
between this method and LIFO is slight, for although they are
similar in purpose, the techniques are radically different. The base
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, s. 22.
8 Ibid., s. 22(d)
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stock system of valuing certain process stock at a fixed figure and
not at cost or market value is not correct for income tax purposes.0
LIFO and the "base stock" methods then cannot be treated as the
same or even very similar.
The Minister's objection to LIFO appears to be the fact that the
use of this method creates a hidden reserve. There is truth in this,
but in a period of falling prices the FIFO method which the Minister
accepts would -also create a hidden reserve. Under the FIFO and
average cost methods, where prices have risen during the year in
question, the closing inventory will be valued at a higher amount
per unit than the opening inventory, thus increasing the taxable
income for the year. Conversely, the use of LIFO in a period of
rising prices, decreases the value of the closing inventory, increases
the cost of goods sold and thus reduces taxable income for the year.
It thus can be argued that in a period of fluctuating prices, the LIFO
method results in a more accurate determination of income earned
during the year whereas the FIFO and average -cost methods result
in improperly inflating or deflating the income of the business by
reason of increases or decreases in the rate at which the basic
inventory of the business is valued. LIFO then matches the current
cost of raw materials to current sales and gives a truer determination
of the year's income in most businesses. Income determined under
the FIFO method contains inventory profits which, of course, will
fluctuate up or down from year to year.
The decision of the Privy Council in the Anaconda case constitutes an endorsement of the FIFO method and suggests without
deciding the matter that in certain cases the average cost method
could properly be adopted. The company in this decision was a
wholly owned subsidiary of a United States parent company producing
copper and other alloys. The parent company used the LIFO method
initially for its own internal purposes in 1936 and in 1946 it filed its
income and excess profits tax returns on this method.
The Exchequer Court, the Supreme Court of Canada and the
Privy Council, all agreed that in Canada the LIFO method is in
certain conditions a proper and generally accepted method of
accountancy and that those conditions are conspicuously present in the
instant case. The Minister contended that however appropriate the
LIFO method might be for the corporate purposes of the company it
did not truly reflect its profit for income tax purposes and accordingly
assessed the company on the FIFO method. The President of the
Exchequer Court in reversing the Minister's decision not only recognized the LIFO method as an acceptable and recognized inventory
accounting method in the circumstances that are appropriate to it,
but also he stated:
"While I need not say more, I also find that the method employed by the
Minister in arriving at his assessment was not a proper one. This is not
the case in which neither of two accounting methods is acceptable. Only
the one method, namely the LIFO method, is appropriate."10
9 See Patrickv. BroadstoneMills, [1954] 1 All E.R. 163.
lo Anaconda American Brass Ltd. v. M.N.R., 52 DTC 1111, at p. 1126.
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Thus it would appear that in the absence of specific statutory
provisions or judicial guidance as to the proper method of computing
inventory values, the Minister has no right to enforce upon a taxpayer
the method of his choice. The taxpayer has a right to rely upon
that method which accepted accounting principles prescribes as most
suitable to his particular facts and circumstances. This is evidenced
by the court's remarks:
"To put it in other phraseology... The method that ought to be selected
is the one that is in accord with the Company's genius of profit-making
and most nearly accurately reflects its income position according to the
manner in which it carries on its business."-

In dealing with the objection that LIFO creates "a hidden
reserve" the Court stated:
"The objection is due to a misconception of the true nature of the closing
inventory."12

In evidence one of the expert witnesses stated that "the closing
inventory is not to be regarded as an asset to be valued but rather
as a residue of unabsorbed costs incurred in the past but applicable
to the future to be charged against the gross income of a future
period."' 3 Thorson P. stated:
"The FIFO method is not based on any assumption of a physical flow of
goods out of stock in the order in which they were received into it, but
on an assumption of a flow of cost factors namely that the cost of the
items1 4 of goods first in will be regarded as the cost of the items first
out."

The President further held that where a manufacturing company
avoids speculating or trading in its materials and makes the sales
price of its finished products closely reflect the current replacement
cost of their materials content and matches its purchases of materials
to its sales of finished products so that the inflow of materials equals
the outflow of the materials content of the finished products and it
continuously maintains a large inventory and the rate of its turnover
is slow, the LIFO method of inventory accounting is the method
that most nearly accurately reflects its income position according to
the manner it carries on its business and is the method that ought
to be applied in ascertaining the materials cost of its sales and
determining its net taxable income.' 5
The Supreme Court of Canada, on the appeal, upheld the findings
and conclusions of the Exchequer Court in a three to two decision.' 6
In confirming the use of LIFO the Court has shown that it is well
aware of the implications inherent in modem accounting theory.
Locke J. states:17
"Neither of the statutes (Income War Tax Act and the Excess Profits
Tax Act) defines the manner in which manufacturing costs of this nature
:IIbid., at p. 1122..
12 Ibid.,

at p. 1124.

:13
bid., at p. 1124.
4
1 Ibid., at
15 Ibid., at

p. 1119.

p. 1126.

16 M.N.. v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., 54 DTC 1179.
17 Ibid., at p. 1188.
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are to be calculated and in the absence of any such direction they are
to be determined, in my opinion, upon the ordinary principles of commercial trading. My consideration of the evidence in this matter leads
me to the conclusion that in a business operation such as this the last
in first out method of inventory accounting determines what was the
true income with greater accuracy than any other method which it was
practical to apply."

Cartwright J. takes this further and states:' 8
"In my view the only question of difficulty raised in this case are questions
of fact... The effect of these authorities is, I think, accurately summarized in the statement quoted from the judgment of Earl Loreburn, L.C.,
in Sun Insurance Office v. Clark (1912), A.C. 443 at 454, that the only
rule of law is that the true gains are to be ascertained as nearly as it can
be done. Where, as in the case at the bar, the dispute as to what are the
true gains for a particular year centers on the question as to which of
the two well recognized systems of accounting will, in the case of the
business carried on by the respondent, most nearly arrive at the true
figure for the material cost of its sales for such year, that question is
one of fact. In my opinion the evidence fully supports the findings of
fact made by the learned President of this crucial question."

The dissenting judgments were apparently founded on the
objection that LIFO is based upon an accounting assumption and not
necessarily a fact. The two dissenting judgments tended to confirm
the method which most closely follows a physical flow of the inventory. The Chief Justice held that even though LIFO is recognized

as a proper accounting method for corporate purposes, this is not
sufficient and it does not determine the company's true profits since
the first in first out method is more in accordance with the known

facts.

Estey J., also dissenting, states: 19

" .. but the problem which must be decided for taxation purposes is
which of the two more nearly approaches the actual value or market
value."

It is submitted that this is not the real issue in question. The proper
question is the determination of the true profit of the business for
the year for income tax purposes within the meaning of Sections
3 and 4 of the Income Tax Act.
The Privy Council reversed the Exchequer Court and the
Supreme Court of Canada and followed the minority of the Supreme

Court of Canada. 20

Their Lordships accepted LIFO as a proper

accounting method and appropriate in the instant case but found the
real issue to be whether LIFO was permissible for income tax purposes
or whether this method most correctly reflected income within the
structure of the Canadian income tax law. The view that LIFO is

based upon an accounting assumption and not necessarily a fact and
that dt does not truly reflect the company's profit for income tax
purposes, was accepted by the Privy Council. Their Lordships
appear to accept the view of the Minister of National Revenue, which

view it was held approximated more closely the result postulated in
very general terms by Lord Loreburn in Sun Insurance Office V.

id, p. 1188.

19 Ibid.,p. 1185.
20 M.N.R.v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., [19562 A.C. 85.
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CMark, 21 i.e. that a true profit for income tax purposes is reached
by applying the tried and true method of determining the cost of
goods by the first in first out method of inventory valuation. This is
indicated by the following statement:
"For many years before and ever since this decision (Whimster & Co.
v,. G.T.R. 12 T.C. 813), what is to be valued at the beginning and end of
the accounting period has for tax purposes to be taken to be the actual
stock so far as it can be ascertained. It is in fact so far as tax law is
concerned a novel, and even revolutionary proposal, that the physical
facts should even, where they can wholly or partly be ascertained, be
disregarded for the purpose of the opening and closing inventory and a
theoretical assumption made which is based
upon a supposed "flow of
22
cost" and "unabsorbed residue of cost."
The Privy Council seems to rely on the same decision (Sun
Insurance Office v. Clark),2 that one of the majority judges relies on
in the Supreme Court of Canada 2 4 This decision gives unqualified
approbation to ordinary principles of accountancy but the Privy
Council uses the broad definition of profits found therein to sanction
one and reject another of two then recognized and accepted accounting methods of costing inventory. The Privy Council adds to this
the concept that income tax is an annual affair and Their Lordships
stated they were not concerned with the profits of the company
before or after the year of the charge for by that time the company
may have gone out of existence and its assets have been distributed.
Section 85(e) of the present Income Tax Act perhaps outdates this
argument by providing for the inclusion of inventory sold by a taxpayer disposing of or ceasing to carry on a business or part of a
business, as income of the last taxation year in which the taxpayer
carried on business. The Privy Council further stated:
"Seventy years ago Lord Herschell said in RusseZ v. Town and County
Bank 13 App. Cas. 418 at 424, 'the profit of a trade or business is the
surplus by which the receipts from the trade or business exceed the
expenditure necessary for the purpose of earning those receipts.' This is
only one of many judicial observations in which it is implicit that no
assumption need be made unless the facts cannot be ascertained. There
is no room for theories as to flow of costs; nor is it legitimate to regard
the closing inventory as an unabsorbed residue of cost rather than as a
concrete stock of metals awaiting the day of process. It is in their
Lordships' opinion the failure to observe, or perhaps it should be said
the deliberate disregard of, facts which can be ascertained and must
have their proper weight ascribed to them which vitiates the application
of the LIFO method to the present case. It is the same consideration
which makes it clear that the evidence of expert witnesses that the
LIFO method is a generally acceptable and in this case the most appropriate method of accounting is not conclusive of the question that the
Court has to decide. That may be found as a fact by the Exchequer
Court and approved by the Supreme Court. The question remains
whether it conforms to the prescription of the Income25 Tax Act. As
already indicated in their Lordships' opinion it does not."
A disturbing feature of the Anaconda decision was the insistence
on a "balance sheet" or "statement of affairs" approach to income
122 [1912] A.C. 443, at p. 450.
2 M.N.R. v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., [1956] A.C. 85 at p. 101.
23 [1912] A.C. 443.

24 M.N.P.. v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., 54 DTC 1179 at p. 1188 per
Cartwright
J.
2
5M.N.R. v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd., [1956] A.C. 85 at p. 102.
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determination. The one important matter appeared to be to ascertain
the "facts" or "physical reality" of the inventory and any conflicting
facts dealing with a proper flow of costs to be matched against
revenues earned over a period of time was treated as mere theorizing
and was disregarded.
It should be observed that the decision of the Privy Council in
the Anaconda case was based on the Income War Tax Act, 26 which
did not contain any provision comparable to Section 14(2) of the
present Act or the regulations passed thereunder. Furthermore, the
Income War Tax Act did not contain a provision such as Section 4
of the present Act which provides that subject to the other provisions
of Part I of the Act, income for a taxation year from a business or
property is the profit therefrom for the year. Neither Section, however, defines inventory "cost" 'or "profit" so the position would appear
to be much the same now as under the Income War Tax Act. It is
possible that enunciation of the valuation of closing inventory by
statute or regulation is not favoured due to the hazards inherent in
a rigid statutory definition, but a great deal of flexibility in the
administration of the Act would seem to have disappeared with the
repeal of Section 14(1) of the Income Tax Act in 1958, under which
any method of computing income by a taxpayer once accepted by the
Minister, must be used in subsequent years unless permission by the
Minister is obtained to change the method adopted. The Minister is
no doubt bound by the Anaconda decision to reject LIFO in establishing income subject to tax and if it is felt that our Supreme Court is
bound to follow the Privy Council's judgment then the only way to
remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs is by amending legislation.
Presumably the Supreme Court of Canada is the court of last
resort for this country since the abolishment of civil appeals by the
Privy Council in 1949. Does the principle of "stare decisis" require
our Supreme Court to follow the decision of the Privy Council in the
Anaconda case? An affirmative answer to this proposition would
appear to be contrary to the concept of a court of last resort. In
Woods Manufacturing Company Limited,2 7 the Chief Justice had this
28
to say:
'Itis fundamental to the due administration of justice that the authority
of decisions be scrupulously respected by all courts upon which they are
binding. Without this uniform and consistent adherence the administration of justice becomes disordered, the law becomes uncertain and the
confidence of the public in it undermined. Nothing is more important
than that the law as pronounced including the interpretation by this Court
of the decisions of the Judicial Committee should be accepted and applied
as our tradition requires ...."

The suggestion from these words is that the Supreme Court is free
to interpret the decisions of the Privy Council while according these
pronouncements strong persuasive authority. Any other state of
affairs would appear inconsistent with the present position of our
Supreme Court. Also, how persuasive or binding should a previous
2

6 R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.

27

2

[1951J S.C.R. 504.

8 Ibid., at p. 515.
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decision of the Supreme Court be on the same court now that it is
the court of last resort even though it was then over-ruled by the
Privy Council? Perhaps it is beyond the realm of probability that
the Supreme Court in considering another case on LIFO would distinguish the Anaconda case on the basis that times have changed
and so have the methods of measuring income.
In 1955 the United Kingdom Royal Commission on the Taxation
of Profits and Income under the chairmanship of Lord Ratcliffe, one
of the distinguished law lords of the Privy Council, stated:
"There is nothing in the tax code itself that prescribes any rules for
ascertaining the basis of cost or for valuing stock in trade. The presumption is that such rules are to be extracted
from trade practice and
29
the principles of commercial accountancy."

The Commission found no special sanctity in the FIFO method, it
being no more than an estimate, and it appeared that other methods
could be used with equal propriety for ascertaining commercial profits.
The Commission recommended therefore that different businesses
should be free, with suitable safeguards, to adopt the method which
best suited their particular commercial needs.
After the war Japan experienced a period of rapid inflation.
The wholesale price index of a variety of commodities rose astronomically. An example is the index of metal and metal products. Taking
1948 as a base year (100) the index was 358.8 in 1950, 637.6 in 1951
and 575.9 in 1952. It will be seen that in these circumstances a strict
adherence to FIFO was ridiculous and in 1950 with the revision of
the Tax Law,3 0 Japan introduced and permitted the use of a form
of LIFO. It is hoped that no such extreme price advances are
required to underline the necessity of accepting LIFO for tax purposes in this country.
The following schedule it is hoped will illustrate the possible
extremes attendant upon the use of FIFO in a period of rising prices.
The only variable will be the above mentioned metal price indices in
Japan. In order to keep other factors constant, the following
assumptions will be made:
(i) 1,000,000 units of the product were sold in each year;
(ii) 1,000,000 units of raw material were purchased in each
year;
(iii) The increase in the cost of purchase is added in each year
to the selling price;
(iv) Expenses are kept constant each year at $800,000;
(v) Income Tax rate remains constant at 50%;
(vi) Purchases are valued at the average at the opening and
closing price indices for the year.
(1956), The Canadian Chartered Accountant, at p. 300.
30 (1954), Canadian Tax Journal, at p. 315.
29
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It may be seen from the above schedule that the income subject
to taxation varies with the method used in costing the closing inventory. Although an extreme example, it serves to point up the
increased tax burden that some taxpayers must bear merely because
their business operations necessitate a large investment in inventory.
Such a taxpayer in a period of rising prices is at a distinct disadvantage and the injustice of the matter is no less prevalent in Canada
than elsewhere. Although price advances in Canada have not been
inflationary, none the less, there has been a steady rise in prices in
the last number of years. Examining the cash position of our
hypothetical concern, in 1951 under the FIFO method of valuation, it
should be noted that of the $5,917,400 received from sales, $2,688,000
cash would be required to finance the constant dnventory figure of
1,000,000 units, $800,000 would be paid out for expenses and $1,411,700
for income taxes, leaving a cash account of $1,017,700. It may
readily be assumed that expenses would increase during this period,
but this would only be offset by decreased taxes in the amount of 50%
of such increased expenses. The possible result is that the concern
would be required to borrow cash to pay its taxes and in effect would
be subsidizing the government on its credit. This could hardly be
said to be the intention of the legislators.
LIFO in Canada then is in a vacuum. The legislature is inactive
perhaps because of the dangers of too rigid a definition of cost and/or
the expectation that the court will alleviate the situation. The courts
on the other hand might be quite hesitant to overrule the recent Privy
Council decision on this point. In the absence of statutory definition
what then is to assist the court in defining "profit" under Section 4
of the present Income Tax Act? Surely it is the test of commercially
accepted trading and accounting methods not of thirty years ago but
of today. No question of tax avoidance enters into -the argument
at all; LIFO can cut both ways, beneficial on occasion and prejudicial
on other occasions. An interesting illustration of this is the
Anaconda case itself. Had the Minister accepted the Supreme
Court's decision and applied LIFO in that case he would have collected
substantially more revenue in subsequent years due to the sharp
decrease in the market price of the metal mainly concerned, namely
copper.

